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In an important theoretical article Speelman and McGann (2013) indicated that psychological
researchers tend to use statistical procedures that involve calculating the mean of a variable in an
uncritical manner. A typical procedure in psychological research consists of calculating the mean of
some dependent variable in two or more samples and to present those means as summaries of the
samples. The next step is to use some statistical technique (e.g., t-test, ANOVA) in order to be able to
determine the probability of finding the observed differences betweenmeans in those samples given
that the difference between the means of the populations from which the samples were extracted
is zero. If this probability is very low (i.e., <0.05) the psychological researcher decides that the
difference between the means of the populations of interest is not zero.
This procedure—the null hypothesis statistical significance testing (NHST) procedure–has
received a huge number of criticisms, which are beyond the scope of this article. However, I would
like to present the anecdote told by Cohen (1994), not only to criticize the NHST procedure itself
but also the uncritical manner in which the procedure is used. Cohen tells us that a colleague
hypothesized that a rare disease did not exist in a population; he then collected a sample of 30
individuals and found that one of them had the disease. He then wondered what type of significance
test should be used in this situation. Obviously, the existence of one case with the disease is enough
evidence to refute the hypothesis, but the uncritical search for a hypothesis testing procedure
precluded the researcher from seeing the obvious.
This anecdote nicely dovetails with Speelman and McGann’s (2013) assertion that psychological
researchers tend to use procedures that involve calculating means in an uncritical manner. The
goal of this article is to emphasize that there are procedures that do not involve calculating means,
which are perfectly sound to answer research questions. In the following sections I will present the
endeavor that other colleagues in the field of psychology of expertise and I embarked on with the
purpose of testing hypotheses of the deliberate practice framework (Ericsson et al., 1993). I will
present four measures that did not involve calculating the mean (i.e., variability, a value, a case, and
distributions) I have used in my research to answer research questions. Before that I briefly explain
the deliberate practice framework.
Deliberate Practice Framework
Ericsson et al. (1993) presented the deliberate practice framework of expert performance. The
framework provides recommendations of how to conduct research in the field of expertise, it
defines what deliberate practice is and it states that abundant deliberate practice constitutes a
necessary and a sufficient condition to achieve high levels of expertise (see Campitelli and Gobet,
2011; Ericsson, 2014; Hambrick et al., 2014a,b for a discussion about the hypotheses of the
deliberate practice framework).
Ericsson et al. (1993) defined deliberate practice as engaging in highly structured domain-
specific activities deliberately developed to correct technical mistakes and to improve
performance, which are conducted with high concentration levels and are followed by
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immediate feedback (e.g., given by a coach). They indicated that
these activities are not typically enjoyable and they distinguished
deliberate practice from other activities such as work and
play. The deliberate practice framework includes the strong
statement that genetic differences among individuals do not
explain differences in expert performance (except for the case
of height in some sports such as basketball), and that genetic
differences may only contribute to expert performance indirectly
through deliberate practice (i.e., there may be genetic differences
in the willingness to engage in long periods of deliberate
practice).
As indicated by Campitelli and Gobet (2011) and Hambrick
et al. (2014a) the deliberate practice framework claims that
abundant deliberate practice is both a necessary and a sufficient
condition to achieve high levels of expert performance in sports,
games, arts, and science.
Answering Research Questions with
Measures of Variability
In a study conducted with 104 chess players (see Gobet and
Campitelli, 2007; Campitelli and Gobet, 2008 for details), among
other questions, Campitelli and Gobet requested participants to
indicate the number of hours of individual and group practice
they had engaged in since they started playing chess. The
procedure was similar to the one used by previous researchers
who mostly favor the deliberate practice framework (e.g.,
Charness et al., 1996, 2005).
In order to test the research question “Is abundant deliberate
practice a sufficient condition to achieve high levels of expert
performance in chess?” Campitelli and Gobet (2011) reviewed
previous literature on chess expertise and utilized three
procedures. In this section I focus on one of them: calculating the
variability of the number of hours to achieve the master level—a
level of expertise 3.5 standard deviations higher than the mean1.
If the variability is small, this would give support to the deliberate
practice framework whereas a large variability would provide
evidence against that framework. This procedure was based on
Gobet and Campitelli’s (2007) dataset. Gobet and Campitelli had
access to archival data that allowed them to determine the exact
year in which the players achieved the master level. They used
these data in combination with the number of hours of practice
that each player accumulated until they achieved the master level.
They then calculated the variability on the number of hours
required to achieve that level. They found a range from 730 to
16,000 h of individual practice to achieve the master level. Thus,
the deliberate practice framework’s hypothesis that abundant
deliberate practice is a sufficient condition to achieve high levels
of expertise was not supported by the data.
1The chess international rating system uses the Elo (1978) scoring system, which
follows a normal distribution with a theoretical mean of 1500 and standard
deviation of 200, in which the current world champion possesses a score of
2876. The psychology of chess literature typically uses the following hierarchy
to categorize chess players: >2600 = grandmaster, >2400 = international
master, >2200 = Master, >2000 = Expert or candidate master, >1800 = Class
A player, >1600= Class B player, >1400= Class C player.
Answering Research Questions with One
Value
As indicated by Campitelli and Gobet (2011) another way of
testing the above hypothesis is to find one individual who
engaged in abundant deliberate practice and failed to attain
the master level. This would rule out abundant deliberate
practice as a sufficient condition to achieve high levels of expert
performance. Campitelli and Gobet reported that there were
several players dedicating more than 20,000 h to chess who
did not achieve the master level; therefore, the hypothesis that
deliberate practice is a sufficient condition was not supported by
the data.
Answering Research Questions with One
Case
Ericsson et al. (1993) hypothesized that 10 years of intense
dedication to a field are necessary to achieve high levels of expert
performance. This claim was slightly changed and popularized
to the general public by the writer Malcom Gladwell in his
bestseller “Outliers” (Gladwell, 2008). Appealing meritocratic
values Gladwell captured the public imagination by coining the
“10,000 h rule”: 10,000 h of intense dedication are necessary to
achieve high levels of expert performance.
In order to test this hypothesis is not even necessary to collect
data because archival data are available. Finding one case in
which a high level of expert performance in chess is achieved in
less than 10 years—in other words, finding a Mozart of chess–
would refute the hypothesis. Indeed, Gobet and Campitelli (2007)
identified more than one case: Ukranian Ruslan Ponomariov and
Hungarian Peter Leko attained the grandmaster level (i.e., 2 levels
[or 2 standard deviations] up the master level) at the age of 14,
and in interviews they both reported having started playing chess
at the age of 7. More impressively, Ukranian-born Russian Sergei
Karjakin obtained the grandmaster level at the age of 12 and the
international master level at the age of 11. At the age of 11 he
was hired by Ponomariov to assist him in the preparation for
the 2002 Chess World Championship match. More recently, the
current world champion, Norwegian Magnus Carlsen obtained
the grandmaster level at the age of 13 and reported that he played
his first chess tournament at the age of 8 (see Gobet and Ereku,
2014, for more details on the case ofMagnus Carlsen). Nowadays,
there are 23 players who achieved the grandmaster level before
the age of 15. These data suggest that 10 years or 10,000 h of
intense dedication are not necessary to achieve high levels of
expert performance.
Answering Research Questions with
Distributions
Hambrick et al. (2014a) re-analyzed Gobet and Campitelli’s
(2007) data and presented a figure (see Figure 2, p. 39) with a
distribution of hours of deliberate practice in three groups of
chess players: master players, expert players and intermediate
players (i.e., players with less than 2000 points ranging a number
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1379
Campitelli Answering research questions without calculating the mean
of categories). Although the mean hours of deliberate practice
between groups differ [masterM = 10,530 h (SD = 7414), expert
M = 5673 h (SD = 4654), and intermediate M = 3179 h (SD =
4615)], as suggested by the large standard deviations, the overlap
among the three distributions is evident by just visual inspection.
For example, as expected, more than 60% of the intermediate
players practiced between 0 and 2500 h. If abundant practice were
a necessary condition to achieve high levels of expertise it is not
expected to have players of the other groups in this interval of low
practice. However, more than 25% of the expert players andmore
than 10% of the master players are in this interval. Moreover,
the mode of the master and the expert groups is located in the
same interval (i.e., between 5000 and 7500 h of practice), with
more than 30% of experts, almost 25% of masters and almost
10% of intermediate players located in this interval. Furthermore,
as expected, about 25% of the masters accumulated more than
17,500 h of deliberate practice; but, unexpectedly, about 2% of the
experts and about 3% of the intermediates also accumulatedmore
than 17,500 h of deliberate practice.
Conclusion
As indicated by Speelman and McGann (2013), calculating
a mean of some dependent variable as a first step of other
statistical procedures is only one of a range of procedures
available for the psychological researcher. There are two main
reasons why psychological researchers tend to overlook the
type of analyses presented above. First, psychological researchers
are trained in application of statistical procedures that are
typically useful for most types of research. Based on my
experience with colleagues of other disciplines, this training
is of high quality, thus psychological researchers have reasons
to be proud of their analytic skills. However, the training
focuses on the application, not the understanding, of those
procedures. Indeed, research has shown that psychological
researchers have difficulties in understanding p values (e.g.,
Badenes-Ribera et al., 2015). Second, psychology has a shortage
of formal (i.e., mathematical, computational) theories that allow
researchers to make precise numerical predictions of values (or
a range of values) in experiments. This leads to relying on
qualitative predictions (i.e., a group will have a higher average
than another group) in which procedures involving calculating
group means are the most appropriate. In this respect, Ericsson
and colleagues should be credited for providing numerical
predictions (i.e., 10 years (or 10,000 h) of deliberate practice
are necessary to achieve high levels of expert performance),
which can be tested with the analytic procedures explained
above.
This article builds upon Speelman and McGann’s (2013) call
for critical use of statistical procedures, and illustrates four
sound procedures to answer research questions, which do not
involve calculating the mean. It is to be hoped that this article
contributes toward the development of formal theories and
ingenious procedures to answer research questions, as opposed
to fitting research questions to the requirements of extant popular
statistical procedures.
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